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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we introduce a notion of \epistemic action" to describe changes in the information states of the
players in a game. For this, we use ideas that we have developed in our previous papers [BMS], [BMS2] and
[B], enriching them to cover, not just purely epistemic actions, but also fact-changing actions (\real moves",
e.g. choosing a card, exchanging cards etc.) and nondeterministic actions and strategies (conditional actions
having knowledge tests as conditions). We consider natural operations with epistemic actions and we use
them to describe signicant aspects of the interaction between beliefs and actions in a game. For this, we use a
logic that combines in a specic way a multi-agent epistemic logic with a dynamic logic of \epistemic actions".
We give (without proof) a complete and decidable proof system for this logic. As an application, we analyze
a specic example of a dialogue game (a version of the Muddy Children Puzzle, in which some of the children can
\cheat" by engaging in secret communication moves, while others may be punished for their credulity). We also
present a sketch of a \rule-based" approach to games with imperfect information (allowing \sneaky" possibilities,
such as: cheating, being deceived and suspecting the others to be cheating).
2000 Mathematics Subject Classication: 03A05, 03B42, 03B45, 03B70, 68T27, 68T30, 68T37, 91A26, 91A28,
91A40
1998 ACM Computing Classication System: C.2.4, E.4, F.4.1, I.2.4
Keywords and Phrases: epistemic action, epistemic logic, dynamic logic, information update, belief change, dis-
tributed systems, games, learning, communication, muddy children puzzle
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1. Introduction 3
1. Introduction
The subject of this paper is a logic that combines in a specic way a multi-agent epistemic logic with
a dynamic logic of \epistemic actions". This work continues and improves on the ideas and techinques
presented in our previous papers [BMS], [BMS2] (joint work with L.S. Moss and S. Solecki), [B] and[B2],
it deals with subjects arising from the work of [FHMV] and it is related to the work in [G], [GG], [BE],[D]
and [JB].
The basic idea is to try to understand and formalize the notion of epistemic update and study it as
an object in itself, in full generality. Intuitively, an epistemic update is a way to model changes which
may aect the epistemic structure of the world. Primarily, these are changes in the information states
of various agents, actions that change beliefs (although they might also change the facts of the world).
But as we shall argue, to better understand the belief-changing eects of such actions, we need to think
of the belief components of the action itself: the action’s own epistemic structure. In particular, actions
in a game - such as a simple \legal" move, a secret or illegal move, a choice of a strategy, a choice of a
belief about other player’s strategies etc -, not only have eects on the player’s beliefs, but they seem to
involve dynamic forms of beliefs: beliefs-as-actions, which are in the same time beliefs about actions and
belief-changing actions.
A rather standard and natural way to model epistemic updates is as input-output transition relations
between epistemic states or models. This is a so-called \relational" semantics (as the one we introduce
in the next section). But we would like to also study epistemic updates as objects in themselves,
describing general types of epistemic changes, which can be described independently of the input and
output states. There are various natural such types, most of which seem to fall under either one (or
more) of the following few categories: (1) direct-information-gathering (learning by direct experiment, by
\seeing", \hearing" or by introspection), (2) information-exchange by communication (sending/receiving
messages, public announcements, interception of private messages etc.), (3) information-hiding (secret
communication, lying, sending encrypted messages, other forms of deceiving actions), (4) information-
loss and misinformation (being lied to, non-introspective learning, starting to hold wrong beliefs, having
gratuitous suspicions). In general, the interesting type of actions that our system can capture are \half-
transparent-half-hidden-actions". For example, a move in a game can be such that some players \see"
some part (or feature) of what is happening but not the whole move; nevertheless, if the \move" is legal
they will necessarily \suspect" it, i.e. regard it as a possibility.
As announced, we model the seeming complexity of such actions by endowing them with an internal
epistemic structure. First, we divide actions in two categories: simple actions and general actions.
Simple actions are deterministic and their eects and appearance are \uniform", i.e. independent of the
context; the general actions are nondeterministic sums of simple actions and can be modeled semantically
as nite sets of simple actions.
A simple action will be given by specifying three distinct pieces of information: (1) its presupposition or
precondition of happening; this refers to the actual world before the action, and it denes the applicability
of this particular action to this particular world: not every action can happen in every world; (2) the
action’s \content", describing the way the action changes the \facts" of the world; (3) the action’s
possible appearances to the agents; i.e. the agent’s views or beliefs about the very action that is taking
place. The preconditions are modelled as functions assigning to each action  some sentence pre. The
meaning of this function is that action  is possible only in a state satisfying pre. The \content" of a
simple action, describing the factual change induced by the action, is given by a function 0 associating
to each simple action  some set 0 of atomic sentences with the meaning that the truth values of the
atomic sentences P 2 0 are \flipped", i.e. changed into the opposite values by the action . The way
we model the \appearance" of a simple action is via epistemic \possibility" relations between actions.
Usually, epistemic accessibility relations in a Kripke structure are used to represent the uncertainty of
each agent concerning the current state of the system. In a similar manner, we endow our actions with
accessibility relations (called \suspicion relations") to represent each agent’s uncertainty concerning the
current action taking place. So we consider arrows !a  between actions ;  to denote the fact that,
if the current action is  then agent a thinks that  may be the current action. In other words, action 
4\appears" to a as being indistinguishable from . (This is not necessarily an equivalence relation, as a
might be deceived into thinking that the current action is not possible, so  itself might not be among
his epistemic alternatives.)
As we shall see, one way to model the update of a state by a simple action is as an operation of
\conditional multiplication" of the two Kripke structures (the static and the dynamic one): the space of
output-states is taken to be a subset of the Cartesian product of the two structures, in which we have
deleted the \imposible pairs", i.e. the pairs (s; ) arising from input-states s which did not fulll the
preconditions of the action . We endow this set of ouput-states with a Kripke structure, by taking the
\product arrows": (s; )!a (t; ) i s!a t and !a ; nally, we use the change-functions to update
the \facts", i.e. the truth-values of the atomic sentences in the new states. As for the general actions,
which are nondeterministic sums of simple actions, they will induce non-deterministic updates: namely,
the update of a state by such a general action will be the set of all possible output-states, obtainable
through updating the initial state by every simple term of the non-deterministic sum.
This semantics reflects the idea of \multiplicating independent uncertainties". We introduce natural
operations with actions, we develop a \calculus of epistemic actions" and we state a \normal form"
representation theorem.
As an application, we use this setting and the logic to study modied versions of The Muddy Children
Puzzle: some children cheat, by sending signals to tell their friends they are dirty; the others might not
suspect it, which can lead to a totally wrong line of reasoning on their part, ending in a wrong answer;
or they could be more cautious and suspicious, which allows them to use other agent’s wrong answers to
nd the truth more quickly than in the classical puzzle. Another application is to games with imperfect
information (and potential misinformation), in the context of which one can use epistemic actions to
formalize a notion of \rule-based" game, given not in the usual extensional tree form, but as a set of
conditional actions, providing the rules and the moves of the game. We introduce strategies in the same
rule-based manner and provide a formalization of (non-probabilistic) Nash equilibrium in modal logic.
2. A Logic for Epistemic Actions
We introduce here a modal language to describe the update of epistemic structures by epistemic actions.
Our language L is obtained by putting together standard epistemic logic (with \common knowledge"
operators) with a dynamic-logic of epistemic actions. For agents a and sets of agents A, we have the
standard epistemic modalities 2a (the belief, or knowledge, operator) and 2A (the common belief, or
common knowledge, operator). The sentence 2a’ will denote the fact that agent a believes that ’,
while 2A’ will mean that ’ is common knowledge among all the agents of the group A. In addition,
we inductively build a set of action-expressions to denote epistemic actions, i.e. \programs" updating
epistemic situations. We build complex action-expressions from basic ones, using dynamic-logic-type
program constructions, which correspond to natural operations with epistemic actions. For each such
action-expression , we have a \dynamic-logic"-type modality []’ ; the sentence []’ denotes the fact
that after action , sentence ’ becomes true, or more precisely, that if  can be executed then every
possible output-state satises ’.
Syntax.
We assume as given a set AtProp of atomic propositions, denoted by P;Q; : : : , and a nite set Ag
of agents, denoted by a; b; : : : . As before, we use capital letters A;B; : : :  Ag to denote nite sets of
agents.
We dene, by simultaneous recursion, a set L of propositions over AtProp (propositions denoted by
’; ; : : : ) and a set ActL of action-expressions over L (expressions denoted by ; ; : : : ):
’;  ::= P j :’ j ’ ^  j []’ j 2a’ j 2A’
;  ::= flipP j ?’ j +  j    j a j A
Informally, the meanings of our action-constructions are: \test ’" ?’ is the action that tests the truth
of a proposition ’, i.e the program which accepts an epistemic state as input i ’ is true (in which
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case it returns the same state). The action flipP changes the value of the atomic sentence P at the
current state, leaving everything else unchanged. The sum  +  is the non-deterministic composition
(\sum" or \choice": perform either  or ) of the two actions, while   is their sequential composition
(\product": perform rst  and then ). The action a is the action of one-step (non-introspective,
not-necessarily-truthful) \learning" (suspicion): \agent a suspects ", i.e. a starts to believe (without
introspection) that some action  might be happening (while in reality no action happens, except for
a getting suspicious). We choose to call this action \suspicion" instead of learning, since its default
assumption is that  did not happen (unless we change the default by rst sequentially composing 
with this suspicion as in   a, i.e. unless we explicitly mention that  did happen). So, by itself,
this is an action which \appears" to a as if  is happening, while in fact nothing is happening (and
everybody else sees that nothing is happening). The action A is the action of mutual (common, or
public) learning of an action inside a given group: the agents in the group A commonly (and truthfully)
learn that  is happening (and indeed  is actually happening). So this action is like , but with the
proviso that it is \transparent" to all the agents in the group A (while this action’s appearance to all
the other agents is the same as ’s).
We shall use the following abbreviations, for sets A of agents and sets P of atomic propositions:
skip =: ?(true) , where true is any universally true sentence
nX
i=1
i =: 1 + 2 +   + n
nY
i=1
i =: 1  2    n
A =:
Y
a2A
a ( the action of general believing)
+A = (A)A ( the action of common, mutual believing)
+a = +fag (the action of fully introspective believing)
P ! = ?P+?(:P )  (flipP ) ( the action \make P true")
−P ! = ?(:P )+?P  (flipP ) (the action \make P false")
if ’ do  else  = ?’  +?(:’)  
Given the above intuitive interpretations of our action-constructions, it is natural to think that the
mutual-learning construct will have the following xed-point property:
(*) A =   +A =   (A)A =  
Y
a2A
(A)a
In other words, to say that the group A commonly learns  is equivalent to saying that, rst,  is really
happening, and then each of the agents in A privately learns that the group A commonly learns . We
shall use this intuitive identity to justify our semantics for A (and later we can check that the identity
really holds, up to epistemic bisimilarity).
Relational Semantics for our Logic:
We introduce here the notion of an epistemic state, which is at the basis of our semantics. We shall
interpret our propositions as properties (or sets) of epistemic states and our action-expressions as binary
relations between epistemic states.
Given as above the sets AtProp and Ag, an epistemic state (or a pointed Kripke model) is a quadruple
s = (W; faga2Ag; 0; v), where W is a set of possible worlds or states, v 2 W is a distinguished world,
called the actual world, each a (for a 2 Ag) is a map a : W −! P(W ) called appearance map for agent
a, and :0 : W −! P(AtProp), called the (factual) content map.
6Since the atomic sentences P 2 AtProp are supposed to describe \facts of the world", the factual
content w0  AtProp of a given world w will be interpreted as dening the set of all \true" facts of the
world w. (Usually, the same information is given by specifying a \valuation" map j:j : AtProp −! P(W ),
and then the factual content can be dened by putting w0 = fP 2 AtProp : w0 2 jP jg. Clearly, the
two approaches are equivalent: if we take factual content as basic, we can dene the valuation by
jP j = fw 2 W : P 2 w0g.) For a world w, the set wa W is called the appearance of world w to agent
a and intuitively consists of all the worlds that are \indistinguishable" from w to agent a: if the actual
world is w then agent a thinks any of the worlds w0 2 wa might be the actual one. The worlds w0 2 wa
are called the epistemic alternatives of the world w (for agent a). A binary relation !a W W of
(epistemic) indistinguishability for agent a can be dened as:
w !a w0 i w0 2 wa:
For the sake of generality, we don’t assume that these relations have any special properties (e.g. reflex-
ivity, transitivity etc): we would like to cover under our approach both false beliefs and true knowledge,
and both introspective and non-introspective beliefs 1. Observe that, in the denition of an epistemic
state, we can alternatively take the indistinguishability relations and the valuations as basic, dene epis-
temic states as quadruples (W; f!aga2Ag; j:j; v), and then dene the appearance functions, by taking
wa = fw0 : w !a w0g. Indeed, this corresponds to the more standard denition of Kripke structures in
terms of \accessibility" relations (and valuation maps).
We denote by Mod the class of all pointed models (i.e. epistemic states). We shall use systematic
ambiguity to identify an epistemic state with its \top" possible world; this is consistent, as long as we
don’t reuse names of possible worlds. This allows us to \lift" the functions a and 0 (and so the relations
!a) from inside a given model to functions dened on pointed models (epistemic states): for instance,
for epistemic states s; s0 we put s!a s0 i, whenever we have s = (W; faga2Ag; 0; v), then we also have
s0 = (W; faga2Ag; 0; v0), for some v0 s.t. v !a v0.
So we can freely talk about appearance maps a and accessibility relations!a at the level of epistemic
states (instead of worlds). This allows us to abstractly specify an epistemic state s, without giving any
explicit epistemic model, but just by specifying two things: (1) the content s0, i.e. the set of atomic
propositions P holding at s; (2) for each agent a, the appearance sa, i.e. the set of all states accessible
from s via a-arrows.
The reason we choose to work with epistemic states and relations between them, instead of states in
a given (xed) Kripke structure (as it is the more standard approach in modal logic and dynamic logic),
has to do with the ’open’ character of learning actions: they may \change" the epistemic structure of
the world in many (possibly innitely many) ways; but on the other hand, we do not want to include all
these possible output-states in the initial structure; on the contrary, we would like to keep our structures
small for as long as possible, so in a given structure we only include the worlds that are considered as
possible at a given moment; to model the output-states of actions that change the epistemic situation we
will have to go beyond the input-structure, due to the lack of enough states. No nite Kripke structure
will suce to model the iterated eects of our actions. Thus, we choose to model actions as relations
between Kripke models (epistemic states), instead of relations inside a given model.
As usual, we dene an knowledge model (state), or S5-model (state), to be a model (state) in which
all the accessibility arrows are equivalence relations, while an S4-model (state) is one in which all the
relations are transitive and Euclidean.
To dene common knowledge, we need to introduce iterated accessibility relations between epistemic
states: for each group A  Ag of agents, we dene the relation !A between epistemic states, as the
reflexive-transitive closure of the union
S
a2A !a; in other words: we have s !A s0 i there exists an
1This generality may in fact produce some confusion, e.g. by our free and naive use of the terms \knowledge" and
\belief" throughout this paper. Let us clarify this here: most of the times we shall use the two terms as virtually
synonymous, even talking about \possibly un-truthful learning"; but in fact, we shall sometimes make the dierence, and
stress the word \knowledge" when we assume the S5-axioms. This should be clear from the context, although it might
helpful to notice that every time we do that, we immediately add the illuminating parenthesis: (S5).
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A-chain s = s0 !a0 s1 !a1    !an s0, with ai 2 A for every i. Correspondingly to the appearance
map, we can now dene an iterated appearance map A : Mod −! P(Mod) for a given set of agents:
sA = fs0 2Mod : s!A s0g.
We now give the semantics, by simultaneously dening the following relations: a truth-relation (satis-
faction) j=ModL between epistemic states and formulas, and, for each action-expression  2 ActL,
a binary transition relation =)ModMod between epistemic states. We read s =) s0 as follows: if
the input-state is s then s0 is one of the possible output-states of applying action . The denition is by
double recursion, on the complexity of formulas and on the complexity of action-expressions.2
(1): Truth:
For propositional and epistemic modal operators we have the usual recursive conditions, while for the
dynamic modalities we use the input-output labeled transition relations: the meaning of []’ is that
every =)-transition starting in the current state ends in a state satisfying ’. So we dene s j= ’, by
recursion on the complexity of ’ 2 L:
s j= P i P 2 s0 for atomic sentences
s j= :’ i s 6j= ’
s j= ’ ^  i s j= ’ and s j=  
s j= 2a’ i s0 j= ’ whenever s!a s0
s j= 2A’ i s0 j= ’ whenever s!A s0
s j= []’ i s0 j= ’ whenever s =) s0
(2): Transition Relations:
For each action-expression, we dene transition relations s =) t, which must reflect the above-
mentioned intuitive meanings of our actions. The semantics for \test" actions ?’, non-deterministic
choice (union)  +  and sequential composition    is essentially the standard one in dynamic logic.
The action flipP will output a state that is completely similar to the input-state, except that the
truth-value of P is reversed (from true to false or vice-versa). The action a of \suspecting " will
output a state t that is in every respect similar to the input-state s, except that the state’s appearance
to agent a has changed: namely, a thinks that  happened, so that a’s epistemic alternatives for the
output-state t are precisely all the possible outputs of applying action  to all a’s epistemic alternatives
for the input-state s. Finally, we use the above-mentioned (intuitively desirable) identity (*), saying
that A =  Qa2A(A)a, to give the semantics for mutual learning: so the output-state t will again
be a state that will be \similar" to some output w of applying action  (to the same input s), namely
similar with respect to the atomic facts and to its appearance to all the outsiders b 62 A; but only the
appearance of t to the insider agents a 2 A will be dierent; namely, they are consciously and mutually
learning , so this mutual learning action A is \transparent" to all the insiders; hence, their epistemic
alternatives for the output-state t will come as the result of updating their own epistemic alternatives
for every possible output of  (applied to the input s) with the very action A of mutual learning which
is taking place.
In the following, we use the notation 4Ψ =: ( nΨ)[ (Ψ n) for the symmetrical dierence of two
sets of atomic sentences (consisting of all sentences which are in one and only one of the two sets).
s
?’
=) t i t = s and s j= ’ ;
s
flipP
=) t i t0 = s04 fPg
(or equivalently s0 4 t0 = fPg), and
2This use of double recursion for simultaneously dening truth and the transition relations is not a peculiarity of our
logic: in fact, this applies as well to the standard semantics of dynamic logic, although this point is not usually stressed.
8ta = sa for every a ;
s
+
=) t i s =) t or s =) t ;
s

=) t i s =) w and w =) t, for some epistemic state w ;
s
a=) t i t0 = s0,
tb = sb for every agent b 6= a and
ta = ft0 : s0 =) t0 for some s0 2 sag ;
s
A=) t i there exists some epistemic state w s.t.:
s
=) w ,
t0 = w0 ,
tb = wb for every agent b 62 A,
ta = ft0 : w0 
A
=) t0 for some w0 2 wag, for every a 2 A.
The last clause might appear to be circular, and in fact it is itself a coinductive denition, which must
be understood as dening 
A
=) as the largest relation on epistemic states which satises the above given
(xed-point) property. This fully denes the semantics of our logic.
Preconditions, Appearance, Change, Choice:
We now dene some useful auxiliary functions on action-expressions  2 ActL: the precondition pre,
the appearance a of action-expression  to a given agent a, the change 0 induced by  in the factual
content of the world (also called the content of ) and the choice set jj (of all possible choices of simple
deterministic \resolutions" of ).
These notations are technically useful (for instance, in stating our axioms), but they also have some
independent intuitive justication. In the next section, the intuitions associated with these functions
will be used to provide an interesting alternative (but equivalent) semantics for our logic. But for now,
they should be understood as simple syntactic notations.3
Precondition. The precondition function pre : ActL −! L associates with each action-expression a
sentence, its precondition pre, which intuitively denes its domain of application:
pre?’ =: ’
preflipP =: true
prea =: true
pre+ =: pre _ pre
pre =: pre ^ []pre
preA =: pre
The intuitions underlying this notation are the following: the \test" action ?’ can only happen in a
state in which ’ is true; a \pure change of facts" flipP or an action of \pure suspicion" a can always
happen (hence we assign them the universally true precondition); the sequential composition    can
happen only if, rst,  can happen, and then, after  is executed,  can happen; in other words, the
precondition of    is the conjunction of the precondition of  and the sentence asserting that the
3To stress the analogy with epistemic states, we shall use the same notations here for the content and appearance of an
action-expression as for content 0 and appearance a functions for epistemic states. No confusion is possible: as mentioned,
these are now just syntactic notations, while the corresponding functions for states were semantic objects describing their
Kripke structures. As announced, in the next section, we shall convert these syntactic notions into semantical ones, and we
shall use again the same notations to denote the corresponding notions of \content" and \appearance" of real, semantic
actions. There as here, these apparently ambiguous notations will be consciously used to reinforce the analogy between
epistemic actions and epistemic states, but there won’t be any possibility of real confusion: the functions in the next section
will be dened on epistemic actions, semantic objects which are formally distinct both from epistemic states (subjects of
our rst denitions above for content and appearance) and from action-expressions (for which the announced syntactic
notations are introduced here).
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execution of  makes true the precondition of . Finally, the action A (the truthful common-learning
of  by the members of the group A) can happen if and only if  itself can happen.
To relate this syntactic denition to our semantics, denote the domain of a relation R ModMod by
dom(R) = fs 2 Mod : sRt for some t 2 Modg, the R-image of a state s: R(s) = ft 2 Mod : sRtg, and
the interpretation of a sentence ’ by k’k = fs 2Mod : s j= ’g (the class all epistemic states satisfying
the sentence). Then we can easily observe that: dom(
?’
=)) = k’k, dom(flipP=) ) = dom( a=)) = Mod,
dom(
+
=)) = dom( =))[dom( =)), dom(A=)) = dom( =)), and dom( =)) = dom( =))\fs 2Mod : =)
(s)  dom( =))g. These identities justify the above denition, and indeed one can easily check by
induction that for every action-expression  we have: kprek = dom( =)).
Appearance of an action. Given an agent a, we dene a function a : ActL −! ActL, giving
the appearance of action-expression  to agent a. The intended intuitive interpretation of the action-
expression a is the \apparent action" from a’s point of view: the way the action denoted by  appears
to agent a.
(?’)a =: skip
(flipP )a =: skip
(a)a =: 
(a)b =: skip (for b 6= a)
(+ )a =: a + a
(  )a =: a  a
(A)a =: a  A (for a 2 A)
(A)b =: b (for b 62 A)
The intuition behind this denition is the following: a \pure test" ?’ or a pure \change of facts" flipP
have no intrinsic epistemic eect, since they are unobservable by the agents (who will thus think that
nothing, i.e. skip, happens). The action-expression a is supposed to represent the action in which
agent a thinks that  is happening: so the appearance of this action to agent a is precisely ; on the
other hand, a is a \private" epistemic action of agent a, an action which cannot be observed by any
outsider; so its appearance to any other agent b 6= a is skip: outsiders think nothing happens. The
appearance of a non-deterministic sum (\either  or ") to an agent a is the non-deterministic sum of
the two appearances; similarly, the sequential composition of two actions (\ followed by ") appears
to an agent as the sequential composition of the appearances of the two actions. Finally, we can use the
intuitive identity (*) to obtain the appearance of the mutual-learning action A =  Qa2Ag(A)a:
its appearance to the \insiders" is the same as the appearance of  followed by this very action of
mutual-learning A; while to the \outsiders", this appearance is exactly the same as the appearance of
 itself: they learn nothing more.
In order to dene a notion of \content" (factual change) of an action-expression and a notion of non-
deterministic choice, we rst need to introduce a notion of simplicity. As announced in the introduction,
\simple" actions are deterministic actions which have \uniform" appearance and \uniform" eects on
the facts of the world, in the sense that the appearance and eect are independent of the current
state. This will be made precise in the next section, but for now it is enough to syntactically dene
simple expressions as the ones which do not contain any \real" non-determinism (any non-epistemic
occurrences of +, i.e. occurrences outside the scope of a pure suspicion operator), although they may
contain \epistemic non-determinism" (i.e. + is allowed inside the scope of such epistemic operators):
Simple action-expressions. The set Act0L of simple action-expressions (expressions denoted by
; ; 0; : : : ) is a subset of ActL, inductively dened by:
;  ::= flipP j ?’ j    j a j A
where  is any arbitrary (not necessarily simple) action-expression.
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It can be easily checked that the transition relations =) corresponding to simple action-expressions are
always deterministic (i.e. they are partial functions). Moreover, one can also check that these relations
change the truth-values of the atomic facts in a uniform manner, independent of the input-state. Using
the same notation as above 4Ψ =: ( nΨ)[ (Ψ n) to denote the symmetrical dierence of two sets
of atomic sentences, we can easily check that: if we have both s =) t and s0 =) t0, then we also have
that s0 4 t0 = s00 4 t00: This shows the \uniformity" of simple action’s eects, and allows us to dene
the following notion:
Content (fact-change eect) of a simple action. We introduce a function 0 : Act0L −!
P(AtProp), called the content, or the change, function. For a simple expression , its content 0
will consist precisely of the atomic facts whose truth-values are changed by the transition relation =):
whenever we have s =) t, we will also have that 0 = s0 4 t0 (where 4 is again the symmetrical
dierence). But we can dene this function in a purely syntactical manner, by induction on simple
action-expressions:
(?’)0 =: ;
(flipP )0 =: fPg
(a)0 =: ;
(  )0 =: 0 4 0
(A)0 =: 0
The intuitive meaning of this denition is the following: a \test" action ?’ (if possible at all) or a \pure
suspicion" action a do not change in any way the \facts" (the objective state of the world); the action
denoted by flipP changes only one fact, namely the truth-value of P (from true to false and vice-versa).
A sequential composition   changes rst the (truth-values of all the ) \facts" that (the action denoted
by)  would change; then it changes (the truth-values of) all the facts that  would change. As a result,
the facts that both  and  would change remain unchanged (since their truth-values are twice flipped);
similarly, the facts that neither of the two actions would change remain unchanged; while the truth-
values of the facts changed by one and only one of the two actions are flipped. Finally, the \objective
content" of A is the same as that of : the eect of this action on the facts of the world is the same
as the eect of action .
Choice (resolution of non-determinism). We dene a choice function j:j : ActL −! P(Act0L),
taking general action-expressions into sets of simple action-expressions. Since simple action-expressions
always denote deterministic actions, the choice set jj can be understood as the set of all possible simple
deterministic \resolutions" of our non-deterministic action.
jj =: fg (for  2 Act0L)
j+ 0j = jj [ j0j
j  0j = f  0 :  2 jj; 0 2 j0jg
jAj = f:+A :  2 jjg
In other words, simple actions are their own (unique) \resolution": there is no real choice to be made;
the nondeterministic sum +0 \sums" up all the choices that are possible in either  or 0; so it can be
resolved in any of the ways  or 0 are resolved. The sequential composition of nondeterministic actions
  0 can be resolved by resolving rst action  and then action 0. Finally, by (*), A =   (+A),
where +A is a simple action-expression (being a product of simple expressions); so indeed, we can use
the resolution of this product to get a resolution of the mutual-learning action A.
We can also introduce an associated choice relation ! ActLAct0L, describing the \choice" of some
simple action, i.e. the transition from a possibly non-deterministic action-expression  to any of its
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simple components. This is dened by putting:
!  i  2 jj:
Alternatively, one can inductively dene it by:
 !  (for every  2 Act0L)
if !  then + 0 ! 
if 0 ! 0 then + 0 ! 0
if !  and 0 ! 0 then   0 !   0
if !  then A ! :+A
Epistemic alternatives of simple action-expressions. By analogy with epistemic states (remem-
bering that, for a state s, its appearance sa is the set of all its epistemic alternatives), we can formally
dene now the agent a’s epistemic alternatives for a simple action-expression  to be all the elements
of the set jaj (i.e. all the simple resolutions of ’s appearance to a). Correspondingly (as in the case of
epistemic states), we can dene (epistemic) indistinguishability arrows between simple action-expressions
!a Act0L Act0L for each agent a:
 ! 0 i 0 2 jaj:
One can easily see that these relations have the following properties (which can alternatively be taken
as providing an inductive denition of the epistemic arrows between simple expressions):
?’!a skip
flipP !a skip
if  !a 0 and !a 0 then   !a 0  0
if !  then a !a 
if b 6= a then a !b skip
if  !a 0 and a 2 A then A !a 0  A
if  !b 0 and b 62 A then A !b 0
Iterated epistemic alternatives of simple expressions. Again by analogy with epistemic states,
we can introduce iterated epistemic relations between simple action-expressions: for each groupA  Ag
of agents, we dene the relation !A as the reflexive-transitive closure of the union
S
a2a !a. (In other
words,  !A 0 i there exists a nite chain of A-arrows linking  and 0.) Also, put:
jjA =: f0 :  !A 0g:
This is called the set of all A-iterated epistemic alternatives of the simple action-expression . It is
important to observe that both jaj and jjA are always nite (if, as we have already have assumed, the
set Ag of all agents is nite).
We stress once again that the concepts of precondition, appearance, (iterated) epistemic alternatives,
content (change) and choice, as dened above, are all just convenient syntactic notations for nite sets
of expressions, or nite-image relations between expressions. Nevertheless, these notations institute a
formal analogy between simple action-expressions (as syntactical objects) and epistemic states (which
are semantical objects): they both have a \factual content" (which is a set of atomic facts) and an
\appearance" (a set of epistemic alternatives) for each agent. As we have seen, epistemic states are
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completely determined by these two pieces of information (content, family of all appearances). One can
easily see that to completely determine the eect of a simple action we need a third piece of information:
its precondition. This suggests that we could think of the semantic counterpart of a simple action-
expression  (i.e. its underlying transition relation =)) as being something very much like an epistemic
state: a triplet (content, appearances, precondition). Indeed, these intuitions will be used in the next
section to provide an alternative semantics for our logic, one that is closer in spirit and in structure to
our syntax than the relational semantics.
3. The Product Semantics
We shall give now an alternative, but equivalent, semantics for our logic. We consider this semantics as
having its own independent motivation, as well as heuristical, philosophical and technical importance.
It is an improvement of the semantics rst introduced in [BMS] and developed in [B] and [B2]. It is
interesting that the origins of this semantics are related to the highly technical work in [BMS] on the
completeness and decidability of epistemic action logics. The main ideas for this semantics occurred as
a side-eect of our attempts to axiomatize the interplay of knowledge, common knowledge and action.
The basic concept is that of a simple epistemic action, which will be the semantic counterpart of
our simple action-expressions. Roughly speaking, this concept is a dynamic analogue of the notion of
epistemic state. The intuition is that an action can have dierent appearances to various agents, which
we can model in a similar manner to the one used for epistemic states: namely, as sets of epistemic
alternatives for each agent. (But of course the alternatives of an action are themselves possible actions,
not states.) Each epistemic alternative for the output-state will come as the output of an epistemic
alternative of the current action applied to an epistemic alternative of the input-state. This is the idea
of a \product-semantics": the uncertainties regarding the state and the ones regarding the action are to
be multiplied. The resulting \static" Kripke structure (of the output-state) is a product of the initial
\static" Kripke structure (of the input-state) with the given \dynamic" Kripke structure (of the current
action).
But this idea cannot be generally applied to every action: it assumes that the two uncertainties (about
the current action and about the current state) are independent. One way this can fail is due to dierent
action’s limited domains of application: some actions may not be applicable to some states. In the worst
case, even if the real action is applicable to the real state, some given epistemic alternative of the action
might be incompatible with some of, or even all, the epistemic alternatives of the input state! In fact,
real learning is based on this phenomenon: increase of knowledge can only come by dropping some of the
prior epistemic alternative-states, i.e. by narrowing the range of possibilities. As shown in [BMS], this
phenomenon can be easily taken care of by endowing our (simple) epistemic actions with preconditions,
i.e. propositions which dene their domain of application. Consequently, we have to \prune" the above
product of the two structures, by deleting all the impossible outputs (of possible actions applied to states
outside their domains). The result is a restricted product operation.
But there is another way this principle can fail, due to non-determinism, or more generally, to what
we will call non-uniformity. Take for instance a conditional, if-then-else action: if ’ do  else . In
any given context, this is not in fact non-deterministic, but both its simple eects (e.g. whether or
not it \flips" the truth-value of some atom P ) and its \appearance" (i.e. what are agent a’ epistemic
alternatives for this action) may depend on the current state (or, more precisely, they will depend on
whether or not the current state satises the condition ’). This is the \non-uniformity" (of eects or of
appearance) of our action.
Consequently, a general action-expression (involving choice +) cannot be interpreted as a simple action
(i.e. one having the above internal epistemic Kripke structure). But by dening (general) epistemic
actions as being sets of simple actions, we can interpret all our expressions  as epistemic actions kk.
This is completely similar to the way we can interpret our formulas ’ as propositions, i.e. sets, or classes,
of epistemic states: k’k = fs 2Mod : s j= ’g.
Epistemic action models. An action-model (K; faga2Ag; 0; pre) consists of a nite multi-agent Kripke
model (K; faga2Ag; 0) and a precondition map pre : K ! L, mapping each element of K to a sentence
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of our language. We also require the Kripke model to be serial: ka 6= ; for any a 2 Ag. (We do this
just because the interpretations of all our action-expressions happen to be serial: no agent \dies" in our
epistemic actions.) To distinguish it from state-models, we call the \possible worlds" k 2 K of an action-
model \possible action-tokens", while the analogue of the \factual content" map 0 : K −! P(AtProp)
will be called the change-function (or just \content" map) of the model. (We interpret P 2 k0 as encoding
the fact that action-token k always \flips" the truth-value of P , from true to false and vice-versa.) As
before, the set ka is called the appearance of (action-token) k to agent a, while its elements are called the
agent a’s epistemic alternatives for k. As for possible worlds, we can introduce an epistemic accessibility
relation between action-tokens k !a k0 (called the \suspicion relation for agent a"), by dening it as
k0 2 ka. Finally, prek = pre(k) 2 L will be called the precondition (or presupposition) of action-token k.
A simple action is just a \pointed action-model", i.e. a tuple  = (K; faga2Ag; 0; pre; k), composed
of (the components of) an action-model and a designated action-token k 2 K, called the \the real
action". We denote by Act0 the class of all epistemic actions. (Observe that, except for the precondition
function, a simple epistemic action is the same kind of formal object as an epistemic state! ) As for
epistemic states, we use systematic ambiguity to \lift" the functions 0; a; pre and the relations !a
from inside action-models to the level of simple epistemic actions. As before, this allows us to specify a
simple epistemic action  by just giving three pieces of information: the action’s precondition pre 2 L
(dening its domain), the action’s content (change-set) 0  AtProp (specifying which atomic sentences
have their truth-values \flipped") and the action’s appearance a to each agent a.
A (general) epistemic action is just a nite set   Act0 of simple actions.4 We put Act =: P n (Act0)
= f  Act0 :  is nite g to be the set of all epistemic actions The choice relation ! Act  Act0 is
dened as the converse of the membership relation: !  i  2 .
As anticipated in the previous section, the intuition is that:  !  means that the nondeterminism
of  can be resolved by choosing the simple action ; that a simple action  is possible only if pre is
true; that the action  changes the facts of the world by \flipping" all the truth-values of the atomic
sentences in 0 (while leaving the others unchanged); nally, a gives the \appearance" of action  to
agent a , i.e. it is the set of all ’s epistemic alternatives from a’s point of view: if  were the real action
happening, then agent a would believe that the nondeterministic action a is happening. In the case
that a is really a non-deterministic action (i.e. a set of at least two simple actions), then we interpret
this as epistemic uncertainty: a suspects that any of the simple actions in a might in fact be happening.
So, epistemically, a deterministic action may \look" like a non-deterministic one.
Interpretation of an action-expression. We give now the semantics of our action-expressions in
terms of action-models. We associate with each simple expression  a simple action  2 Act0, called the
correspondent of ; simultaneously, we dene, for each action-expression , an interpretation kk 2 Act.
(The interpretation of simple actions  will be just the singleton fg.) First, to dene  for simple
actions  2 Act0L, we put:
pre =: pre
0 =: 0
a =: kak
For general epistemic actions  2 ActL, we dene:
kk =: f :  2 jjg:
This completely species the correspondent simple action  and the interpretation kk. Roughly speak-
ing, the interpretation map is simply taking the syntactic notations introduced in the previous section
and making them into a semantics.
4Yes, it might be confusing, but it’s formally true: a simple action is formally not a (general) epistemic action (but it
can be an element of an epistemic action). But in practice, I won’t stress the dierence between the simple action  and
the epistemic action fg. This also explains why I will be reusing the ’s later to denote strategies, which (far from being
simple) are in fact rather complex epistemic actions... But I do hope that by then there won’t be left any possibility of
confusion.
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Truth and update. The promised alternative semantics for our logic can be given by simultaneously
dening three functions: update of a state by a simple action (a partial function : : ModAct0 −!Mod),
update of a state by a general epistemic action : : Mod  Act −! P(Mod) and the interpretation (or
truth-set) of a formula k  k : L −! P(Mod). The update s: of a given state s with a simple action 
gives the (unique, if at all existing) output-state resulting from applying the action to the input-state.
The update s: of a state with a general epistemic action gives the set of all possible output-states that
can result from the execution of  on s. Finally, the interpretation of a formula gives the class of all
epistemic states satisfying the formula.
First, the simple update: for states s 2Mod and simple actions  2 Act0, we put
s: is dened i s 2 kprek
(s:)0 =: s0 4 0
(s:)a =: fs0:0 : s0 2 sa; 0 2 ag
This is indeed a formalization of the above-mentioned idea of \multiplying the uncertainties": after using
the precondition function to eliminate the \impossible outputs" (of simple actions applied to inputs which
do not satisfy their preconditions) and using the content function to appropriately change the facts of
the input-state, we describe the appearance of the output-state to each agent as the \product" of the
two appearances (of the initial state and of the action) to the same agent. In other words, the epistemic
alternatives of the output are all the consistent outputs of applying the epistemic alternatives of the
action to the epistemic alternatives of the input. This is indeed a sort of restricted product of the two
Kripke structures.
Next, the general update: for general epistemic actions  2 Act, we dene
s: =: fs: :  2 g:
This formalizes the idea that the output of a non-deterministic action is just the set of the possible
outputs of all its simple deterministic resolutions.
Finally, the interpretation k’k of a formula ’ 2 L is dened by:
kPk =: fs 2Mod : P 2 s0g
k:’k =: fs 2Mod : s 62 k’kg
k’ ^  k =: k’k \ k k
k2a’k =: fs 2Mod : sa  k’kg
k2A’k =: fs 2Mod : sA  k’kg
k[]’k =: fs 2Mod : s:kk  k’kg
This is just the extensional version of our previous denition of truth for the logic of epistemic actions.
We can easily check that our two semantics are equivalent, in the following sense:
Proposition 3.1 For every s; s0 2Mod,  2 ActL;  2 Act0L and ’ 2 L, we have:
s
=) s0 i s0 2 s:kk
s
=) s0 i s: = s0
s j= ’ i s 2 k’k
In conclusion: the purpose of introducing this alternative semantics is to have a semantical notion of
action which can capture in a compact way general types of epistemic change. Unlike transition relations
between epistemic states, our epistemic actions are nite objects, which nevertheless describe changes
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that can aect innitely many epistemic states: usually, they can be applied again and again, and their
domain of action is usually a proper class of states. Given any nite input-state and any epistemic
action, we can easily compute the output via the above-described update operation (a \product" of the
two Kripke structures). As we shall see later, a rule-based game can be specied semantically by giving
a nite set of epistemic actions (together with some winning conditions), while a game-playing situation
is specied by giving a game and an initial epistemic state.
4. Examples and Properties of Epistemic Actions
Examples. To give some examples of action-models corresponding to natural actions, let us x our set
of agents Ag = fa; b; cg.
1: (Private, Truthful, Conscious, Introspective) Learning: Agent a learns (discovers) that
some proposition ’ is true. The act of learning is done in private: while it is happening, nobody else
knows, or even suspects, that it is happening. (Accordingly, after this action, agents b and c remain in the
same information-state as before.) The act of learning is indeed learning and not just a belief-revision,
in the sense that it is truthful: ’ is actually true. The act of learning is conscious and introspective, in
the sense that agent a knows what she is doing and knows that nothing else happens in the meantime.
This action  can be represented in our language as conscious-introspective-truthful-and-secret learn-
ing action:  = (?’)a: In terms of action models, it can be described by a structure with two action-
tokens, K = fk; lg. Here k represents the \real" action that is taking place (learning of ’ by agent a),
action which has as presupposition the truth of ’, prek = ’: one cannot truthfully learn something
false. (If we wanted to model a notion of \truthful and informative (non-redundant) learning, we would
have to add as extra-presupposition the fact that agent a doesn’t know ’ before the action, i.e. we
would put prek = ’ ^ :2a’.) On the other hand, l represents the action that agents b and c think that
is taking place, namely nothing: l = skip will just be the \trivial" action in which nothing changes. This
trivial action can \happen" anywhere, prel = true. Also, the trivial action is completely \transparent",
in the sense that, if it happens, then everybody knows it is happening; so it is its own only successor:
l!a l; l!b l; l!c l (and no others). On the contrary, action-token k \looks like" the trivial one l from
the point of view of b and c, i.e. k !b l; k !c l, while the same action-token k is \transparent" to a,
who knows that k is happening, so she considers k as its own only alternative: k !a k. The picture is
b, c
a
ϕ
∗
k l
a,b,c
T
where the action-tokens are represented by boxes that surround their own presuppositions and the star
is used to mark the designated \top" action-token (the \actual action"). We do not explicitly draw the
choice relation and the change-functions, as they are trivial: the actions are deterministic and \purely
epistemic" (no change of facts). So k ! k; l! l and k0 = l0 = ;.
2: Secure Group Announcements with no Suspicion: Suppose a and b get together, without c
suspecting this (or, alternatively, suppose a and b have common access to a secret, reliable and secure
communication channel). Agent a makes a sincere announcement ’ at this gathering (or sends a sincere
message over this channel). Here, \sincere" means that a actually believes ’ to be true, and we actually
assume more, namely that a and b trust each other. As mentioned, c does not suspect that this is
happening: he trusts a and b and does not even consider the possibility of such a secret communication.
(Or, alternatively, one can say that the act of communication is done in such a misleading way, that it
appears to c as if nothing happened, and that nothing could happen.) This action can be described as
 = (?2a’)fa;bg and can be represented by the action model
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k
∗
a,b,c
Tlϕa
a, b
c
Here, K = fk; lg as before, k !a k; k !b k; k !c l, l !a l; l !b l; l !c l, prek = 2a’ (since the
announcement is \sincere", so the presupposition is that a believes ’), prel = true (the universally true
condition). As before, k0 = l0 = ;.
3: Message-Passing over unreliable channels (but still no suspicion): As before, agent a sends
a message to agent b, without c suspecting that this is happening. The message is again \sincere" and
a and b trust each other. The communication channel is secure, but not completely reliable: messages
can be lost before reaching b. But in fact, the message is received by b. The picture is more complex
this time:
a,b,c
c lk
ϕ
a
T
t
a
b,c
a
ϕ
a
a,b
The reason is that a cannot distinguish between the real action-token k and the alternative action t
in which b does not receive the message. If t were the \real" action, then b’s view of the action would
be the same as c’s: i.e. they would be both mislead into thinking that \nothing happened" (i.e. they
will believe the \trivial" action l is the one that is happening).
4: Reliable, Secure Group announcements with a suspicious outsider: As in example 2, but
now c is suspicious: he doesn’t trust a and b so much, so he suspects this group announcement might
be happening. He does not necessarily believe it is happening, but he doesn’t exclude such a possibility.
On the other hand, a and b know this, and moreover they have common knowledge of this suspicious
character of c.
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a,b,c
Tk c
a,b,c
ϕa l
Another example 5is the action \show your card": agent a shows her red card to b, in the presence of
c; c witnesses the act of showing the card, but does not actually see the card. However, c knows that
a has either a red or black card (either because of prior information, or because he learns it during the
act of showing: maybe in the same time a publicly announces that she has either a red or a black card).
The picture is the following:
a, b, c
c
RED(a) BLACK(a)
*
a, b, c
5: Group Announcements with a (Secure) Wiretap: As in the last example, but now c is
not only suspicious, but extremely curious: he actually wiretaps the conversation between a and b (or
violates their mail etc.). So c knows about the announcement, while a and b don’t suspect this: they
just do no consider wiretapping as a real possibility; but they still know that c is suspicious, so they
do suspect that c suspects something. But (due to his wiretapping) c knows all this (including their
suspicion about his suspicion).
5This is Hans van Ditmarsch’s example, see [D].
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c
ϕa k
∗
a,b,c
l
a,b.c
Ttc
a,b ϕa 
6: Fact-changing: Exchange of Cards: All the previous examples were \purely epistemic", with
no changing of facts. Suppose that it is common knowledge that there are only two cards left in a game,
a red one and a black one, and that a has one of them and b has the other. Suppose that, in fact, a has
the red card before this action but that a and b publicly exchange their cards, in the presence of c (who
sees the exchange, but not the cards). The picture is:
RED(a)&BLACK(b) BLACK(a)&RED(b)
*
RED(b), BLACK(b)}
{RED(a), BLACK(a), {RED(a), BLACK(a),
RED(b), BLACK(b)}
a, b, c
 a, b, c
 
c
where the sets inside represent the content of the actions (the atomic facts whose values are flipped).
7: S5-Actions and S4-Actions: How about the case of \fully introspective actions" and of \knowl-
edge actions" (in which nobody is deceived, in addition to full introspection)? An knowledge-action (or
S5-action) is one in which all the accessibility relations are equivalence relations. Similarly, a belief-action
(or S4-action) is one in which all the accessibility relations are transitive and Euclidean.
8: Non-deterministic Actions: Let us change the previous example such that the same type of
card-exchange takes place, but that we are not given any information concerning who has the red card.
This is a non-deterministic action, which can be represented as the set (or the sum) of the two alternative
actions present in the previous example. We don’t know anymore which one is the \top", the actual
action. We can also represent this by explicitly drawing the choice transition:
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RED(a)&BLACK(b)
c
a, b, c
a, b, c
RED(b)&BLACK(a)
RED(b), BLACK(B)}
{RED(a), BLACK(a),
RED(b), BLACK(B)}
{RED(a), BLACK(a),
Example of \product" update: Suppose we have 3 agents, a, b and c, and that there is some relevant
fact P , known only to a (for instance P might be the fact that agent a has an Ace in a poker game);
moreover, suppose it is public knowledge that a knows whether P or not (say, because the \rules of the
game" are such that everybody knows his/her own card). The initial epistemic state can be represented
by the following Kripke structure:
P P
b, c
a, b, c a, b, c
in which the possible states or worlds are represented by circles, the accessibility relations by arrows, and
the \actual" world is the one in which P holds (while b and c cannot distinguish between it and the other
\possible world", in which P fails). Suppose now that, without c knowing or suspecting anything, a tells
b that P holds; moreover, a and b are mutually trusting each other, so that it is common knowledge
among them that what a says is actually true. This is a \secure group announcement with no suspicion",
of the kind described in Example 2 above: the picture of this action is precisely the one in Example 2, if
we take the announcement ’ to be the atomic sentence P itself. Using the above denition for update,
one can easily compute the output epistemic state:
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a, 
P
b, c
P
b
a, b, c
a, b, c
cc
P
where the \actual" world is the one on top, in which both a and b know in common that P , while c
considers as possible only the \old worlds" (the states on the bottom, identical copies of the old states,
in which b didn’t know whether P holds or not). As expected, this action is misleading c, inducing him
to have false beliefs about the world (as shown by the non-reflexive arrows).
Bisimulation of epistemic actions: The standard notion of observational equivalence for epistemic
states is bisimilarity. We remind the denition of this important concept, by introducing it in a slightly
non-standard manner, via the notion of powerset-lifting of a relation: this is a way to naturally \lift"
any binary relation on objects to a relation on sets of objects. 6
Denition Given a binary relation R  C  C on a class C, the powerset-lifting of R is a binary
relation R  P(C)P(C) between subsets of C, dened by
A RB i 8a 2 A9b 2 BaRb and 8b 2 B9a 2 AaRb:
An epistemic bisimulation is a binary relation R ModMod between epistemic states s.t.:
if sRt then s0 = t0 and sa Rta (for all a 2 Ag):
It is easy to see that this denition is equivalent to the standard \back-and-forth" conditions dening
bisimulation between pointed Kripke models. The powerset-lifting R of any epistemic bisimulation R is
called a set-bisimulation. 7 Two states (or sets of states) are said to be bisimilar, written as s  t, if
there exists some bisimulation (or set-bisimulation) relating them. We write s  t for bisimilar states,
and S  T for sets of states.
One can easily dene an analogue relation of observational equivalence for epistemic actions, by adding
identity of preconditions as an extra-requirement for bisimulation:
Denition A simple-action bisimulation is a binary relation R  Act0Act0 between simple epistemic
6More precisely, the importance of this notion is related to the Extensionality Axiom in set theory: if we take R as our
notion of identity for objects (i.e. we identify objects modulo R) then the Extensionality Axiom implies that the resulting
notion of identity between sets of objects is given by R.
7Observe that R is a binary relation between sets of states; as mentioned in the previous footnote, if we take a
bisimulation R to be our notion of equivalence for epistemic states, the we should take the corresponding set-bisimulation
R as our notion of equivalence between sets of states. We can thus read the above denition of bisimulation as imposing a
minimal requirement for the relation R to be acceptable as a good notion of observational equivalence between epistemic
states: if we identify two states (via R) then we should identify their contents (via =) and their appearance-sets (via R).
5. Epistemic Actions and Information Flow in Games 21
actions s.t.:
if R then pre = pre; 0 = 0 and a Ra (for all a 2 Ag) :
The powerset-lifting R  P(Act0) P(Act0) of any simple-action bisimulation R is called an epistemic
action bisimulation. (Observe that R is indeed a binary relation between general epistemic actions.)
Two (simple) actions are said to be bisimilar, if they are related by some (simple) action bisimulation.
We write    for bisimilar simple actions, and    for bisimilar (general) epistemic actions.
We mention here, without proof, the following results:
Proposition 4.1 \Bisimilar actions applied to bisimilar states yield bisimilar outputs": If
s  t and    then s:  t:. In words: given two bisimilar actions acting on two bisimilar input-
states, every possible output of the rst action applied to the rst input-state is bisimilar to some output
of the second action applied to the second input-state (and vice-versa).
Proposition 4.2 S5-actions applied to S5-states yield S5-outputs. Similar, S4-actions applied to S4-
states yield S4-outputs.
Proposition 4.3 (Complete equational system ) There exists a complete equational calculus of
epistemic actions; i.e. there exists an equational system, containing equations between terms involving
the action operations of our syntax (test, flip, sum, sequential composition, suspicion a and common
learning A), system which is sound and complete with respect to action bisimilarity.
Proposition 4.4 (Completeness and Decidability) The axiomatic proof system presented on the
next page provides a sound and complete axiomatization for this logic. The proof method implies also
that the logic is decidable.
Proposition 4.5 (Completeness for S5 (and S4) actions and models) If we restrict our class
of models to knowledge models (i.e. S5-models) and the class of epistemic actions to knowledge (S5)
actions, then we can obtain a sound and complete proof system for this class by adding to the system
above the standard multi-agent S5 axioms. Similar remarks apply to S4-models and S4-actions.
Proposition 4.6 (Normal Form Representation Theorem) Every (nite) action is bisimilar
to a (nite) sum of products of tests ?’, change-actions (of the form change =
Q
P2P flipP ) and
suspicion-actions a. Moreover, this representation is unique (up to reordering and bisimulation).
More precisely, if we put change() =:
Q
P20 flipP then we have:
 =
X
2
?(pre)  change() 
Y
a2Ag
(a)a:
Proofs of older versions of these results (for logical systems that are similar to the present one, but
lacking nondeterminism and fact-changing actions) can be found in our papers [B], [BMS], [BMS2]; the
proofs for the present version are contained in our soon-to-be-published [B2]. The proof of completeness
uses a terminating rewriting system for sentences and action-expressions and a ltration argument similar
to the one by Kozen and Parikh to prove the completeness of PDL.
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Dialogue Games: An Analysis of a Muddy Children Game.
As an application of our method, we give a analysis of a \modied muddy children" puzzle, similar
to the one given by Gerbrandy to the classical version of this puzzle. There are four children a; b; c; d,
the rst three are the muddy ones. Each can see the others but not himself. The father comes and
says publicly: \At least one of you is muddy". Then they play a game, in rounds. In each round they
all simultaneously announce publicly one of the following: \I know I am muddy", \I know I am not
muddy", \I don’t know (whether I am muddy or not)". After many rounds (say four for convenience),
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Basic Axioms
All propositional validities
([]-normality) ‘ [](’!  )! ([]’! [] )
(2a-normality) ‘ 2a(’!  )! (2a’! 2a )
(2A-normality) ‘ 2A(’!  )! (2A’! 2A )
Composition Axiom ‘ [  ]’$ [][]’
Nondeterministic Choice ‘ [+ ]’$ []’ ^ []’
Mix Axiom ‘ 2A’! ’ ^
V
a2A2a2

A’
Simple-Action Axioms
Let  be a simple action-expression.
(Change of Facts)
If P 62 0 then ‘ []P $ (pre ! P )
If P 2 0 then ‘ []P $ (pre ! :P )
(Partial Functionality) ‘ []:$ (pre ! :[])
(Action-Knowledge) ‘ []2a’$ (pre ! 2a[a]’)
Modal Rules
(Modus Ponens) From ‘ ’ and ‘ ’!  ; infer ‘  
([]-necessitation) From ‘ ’; infer ‘ []’
(2a-necessitation) From ‘ ’; infer ‘ 2a’
(2A-necessitation) From ‘ ’; infer ‘ 2A’
Action-Common-Knowledge Rule
Let  be a simple action-expression, ’ be a sentence and A be a set of agents. Consider some
sentences  for all  2 jjA (i.e. all  such that  !A , including  itself). Assume that:
1. ‘  ! []’.
2. If a 2 A and 0 2 a, then ‘ ( ^ pre)! 2a0 .
>From these assumptions, infer ‘  ! []2A’.
Figure 1: The proof system for the logic of epistemic actions
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the game stops. The ones who gave a correct \denite" answer (\muddy" or \not") win (say 10 points),
the ones who gave a wrong answer lose (-10 points), the ones who still don’t know nish with 0 points.
In the classical puzzle, it can be proved that in certain assumptions (namely, that it’s common knowl-
edge that all children are sincere in their answers, that they are\good logicians" and that they do not
\take guesses", but they answer only they know it) then all the dirty children win in three rounds and
the others win in the fourth run. But one of the not so easily observable assumption is the absence
of secret communications. Even if the children are sincere and do not \cheat" by lying or guessing,
there are some more subtle forms of cheating. Let’s suppose for instance that, after the rst round (but
before the third), children a and b (very good friends, trusting and helping in each other even at the
price of cheating, because... a friend in need is a friend indeed...) decide to \cheat" by sending each
other secret signals to communicate the message: \You are dirty". Naturally, in the second round, they
both answer \Yes, I know I am dirty" and win. Child c is also a very trustful person, so trustful that
she cannot imagine that such a dirty and secret communication between her dirty colleagues could have
taken place. So, in the third round, she is confused: thinking that a and b used only their reasoning
abilities to answer, she concludes that (the only way for this to have happened is if) a and b were the
only dirty ones. So she hurries to answer \I know I am not muddy" and she loses! The fourth child d is
the only \clean" one, and he has two possibilities: he either \gets suspicious", i.e. starts entertaining the
possibility (which soon becomes a certainty, after c’s wrong answer) that a and b cheated; or he could
still go on and think this is impossible. In the rst case, his action of suspicion will help him to win in
the end: after the third round, he gets convinced that a and b cheat, that c is deluded and that himself
(d) is clean, which he actually will say in the fourth run, winning! But in the second, he will \go crazy":
he will never understand what happened: after the third run, his set of beliefs is not only false, but is
actually inconsistent!
Let, for each agent i 2 Ag = fa; b; c; dg, Di;Wini; Losei be some atomic sentences, meaning \i is
dirty", \i wins 10 points", \i loses 10 points". We make the following abbreviations (some of which are
inspired from Gerbrandy’s analysis):
0i = :Wini ^ :Losei (\i didn’t lose or win yet")
WinI =
^
i2I
Wini (\ all agents in I are wining")
LoseI =
^
i2I
Losei (\ all agents in I are losing")
DI =
^
i2I
Di ^
^
i62I
:Di (\I is the set of all dirty kids")
2+i ’ = 2i2

i’ (\i reflexively and introspectively believes ’")
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Y esi = 2+i Di (\i believes he is dirty")
Noi = 2+i :Di (\i believes he is not dirty")
Y esI =
^
i2I
Y esi
NoI =
^
i2I
Noi
?i = :Y esi ^ :Noi (\i doesn’t know if he’s dirty or not")
Righti = (Di ^ Y esi) _ (:Di ^Noi) (\i is right in his/her belief")
Wrongi = (Di ^Noi) _ (:Di ^ Y esi) (\i is wrong in his/her belief")
father = Da _Db _Dc _Dd (\one of you is dirty")
vision =
^
i6=j2Ag
2Ag(Di ! 2jDi)
Ansi = fY esi; Noi; ?ig
Ans = f
^
i2Ag
i : i 2 Ansi for all i 2 Agg
\Vision" says it is common knowledge that everybody sees the others (and so knows, with full intro-
spection, whether or not the others are dirty). Ansi is the set of i’s possible answers (in one round of
questioning); Ans is the set of possible \global answers" to father’s question (tuples of answers of each
agent in one round).
For actions we introduce the following abbreviations:
cheati;j = (Di? Dj?)fi;jg (\agents i and j cheat")
suspiciond = (
X
i;j 6=d
cheati;j + skip)d (\d suspects cheating is happening" )
WinRule =
Y
i2Ag
[if (0i ^Righti) do (Wini)! else (if (0i ^Wrongi) do (Losei)! else skip)]
PA =
Y
2Ans
(? WinRule)Ag (\public answering" )
Cheati;j is the cheating communication action, by which i and j secretly exchange messages concerning
their own dirtiness; suspiciond is the action by which d starts to suspect that cheating (by any of the
other pairs of players) might be happening (but he is not sure); WinRule is the winning rule of the
game: the player whose answer is right wins, the player who is wrong loses, and the undecided ones
can continue to \play". PA is the main move of this game: the public action of all the players publicly
answering father’s question in the same round; we made the winning rule part of it, since we think of
each round as being immediately followed by the exclusion from the game of all the \decided" players
(who win or lose according to the public winning rule); only the undecided can continue to play.
Assume Ag = fa; b; c; dg. Then the classical muddy children puzzle is explained by the following
theorem of our logic,:
‘ Da;b;c ^2Agvision! [fatherAg][PA][PA][PA](Wina;b;c ^ [PA]Wind):
This theorem that, if the initial state is such that a; b and c are only dirty players and they all can see
each other, than after father’s public announcement, followed by two rounds of public answering, all
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the dirty players \win" (by correctly answering in the third round), and then the clean player also wins
in the fourth round. This shows that, if no cheating occurs, then indeed after four rounds everybody
\wins" (i.e. nds out if he/she’s dirty or not). In the case that cheating by a and b does take place, the
following theorem explains the (false, but rational) conclusion of c (that she is clean), conclusion which
leads to her \defeat":
‘ Da;b;c ^2Agvision! [fatherAg][PA][cheata;b][PA](Wina;b ^ [PA]Losec):
If d starts to suspect what is happening, then he will truthfully conclude that he is clean, winning in
the fourth round:
‘ Da;b;c ^2Agvision! [fatherAg][PA][cheata;b][suspiciond][PA][PA][PA]Wind:
In fact, it is even more natural to model d’s \suspicious" behavior by assuming that he suspects cheating
at every stage of the game (as he cannot know for sure when it’ll happen). If, instead of PA, we
take the main move of the game to be the action of \public answering with d-suspicion", dened by
PA−d =: suspiciond  PA, then we can similarly prove that:
‘ Da;b;c ^2Agvision! [fatherAg][PA−d][cheata;b][PA−d][PA−d][PA−d]Wind:
So our logic can faithfully represent the player’s reasoning in this example.
Rule-based Games.
As usually dened in game theory, a game is just a tree, with nodes corresponding to the possible
successive states of the game and labeled arrows between them, corresponding to the possible moves.
Each non-terminal node is labeled with the name of some player a 2 Ag, who is the supposed to move
at that node. For each player a, it is given an \information partition" of the set of all states, which is
essentially to the same as having equivalence relations a on this set for each player.
There are some in-built problems with this model. First, it assumes that no player ever \cheats" and
no player is ever \deceived": the epistemic relations being equivalence relations, there is no way to model
false beliefs inside this model. There are known proposals for ways to deal with this issue, and with the
more general issue of the interplay between beliefs, actions, strategies, beliefs about strategies etc. in a
game; but all these proposals go way beyond this simple tree-model of a game.
Secondly, there is a computational problem, related to the enormous size of the set of all possible
states in most natural games. Since the model has to contain at once all possible future states of the
game, the size of such a model will typically be huge, and by default the associated logics will become
computationally intractable, if not plainly undecidable. This \brute force" approach to modeling games
can still be useful for many purposes, but it provides no way to express softer, more subtle, ways to
play a game, based on reasoning about the rules of the game, on local (and temporally circumscribed)
reasoning about strategies and mutual beliefs of the player as they appear at the moment of playing.
There is no principled way to calculate in advance the next possible states and the next beliefs of the
players, except for just looking at the future nodes of the tree; this is like trying to anticipate the future
of a game, but not by using reasoning based on rules, but by just... playing (and in fact, playing all the
possible moves).
We sketch here another proposal for modeling a notion of \rule-based games". Due to the lack of a
Kleene star (iteration operator) from our logic (see the last section for the reasons we chose not to have
one), we have to restrict ourselves to games of bounded length. Our syntax will essentially be the one of
our epistemic action logic, for some nite set Ag of \players"; we only have to add some special atomic
sentences fP ka ga2Ag;1kma (for some natural numbers fnaga2Ag), which express winning conditions: P ka
means \player a nishes with a payo of at least k" (or, say, \player a wins at least k dollars").
In this section we will restrict our class of epistemic states to S4-states. (Correspondingly, we will
only consider S4-actions.) Hence, we assume as additional axioms the standard multi-modal S4-axioms.
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Denition A game will be a tuple G = (fMaga2Ag; fPkag1ma;N) consisting of the following: for
each player a, a nite set Ma  Act of epistemic S4-actions, called the possible moves of player a, and
satisfying a   for every  2 Ma (i.e. \players know their moves" 8); for each player a and number
1  k  ma, some set of epistemic states Pka, understood as the set of all states in which player a wins
a payo  k; and an upper bound N for the number of rounds of the game. Usually, these components
will be assumed to satisfy a list of extra-conditions, enumerated below.
The conjunction of the requirements that all moves  2 Ma are S4-actions and that a   implies
the following: every move  2 Ma is a set of a-reflexive simple actions (i.e. s.t.  !a ) and moreover
this set is closed under a-accessibility (i.e. if  2  and  !a 0 then 0 2 ); in other words, each
a-move is a union of !a-equivalence classes. This, in its turn, implies the validity of the following two
schemas:
2a[]’ −! []2a’
<  > 2a’ −! 2a[]’
for every a-move  2 Ma and every simple component  2 . The rst schema expresses a \perfect-
recollection"-type postulate: if a player knows (or believes) that after he’ll play some move  sentence
’ will become true, then after he really plays move  he will know (believe) ’ to be true. In other
words, a player cannot be \totally surprised" by his own move: performing it will not contradict any
of his prior beliefs. The second schema says that, if after a a player’s chosen move is actually executed
(and realized) as a concrete simple action  the player comes to know (believe) sentence ’, then he must
have known (believed) already before the move that such a realization of his move as  would make ’
to be true. In other words, a player cannot be \deceived" by any (simple-action-)realization of his own
move; all the simple actions  subsumed by his move are non-deceiving:  !a . As a result of these
two schemas, the only way a player can \learn" from his own move is by learning which of the simple
actions subsumed by his move is actually executed; but no simple component-action in itself is adding
any new knowledge to its author.9
We put Play =: kprek (the class of all states in which move  is \playable"), Playa =:
S
2Ma Play
(the class of all states in which player a is to play rst), Play =:
S
a2Ag Playa (the class of all \playable"
states), M = MG =:
S
a2AgMa (the set of all possible moves), Pa =:
S
k P
k
a (the set of all winning
states for player a), T =:
T
a2Ag Pa (the set of all possible \outcomes", i.e. terminal states, in which
everybody wins something). For a set of outcomes O  T, we dene the minimal payo Oa of player a
in O by Oa =: the largest k s.t.O  Pka.
We also dene the following game-related action-terms: the game-action γ = γG =:
P
2M , the
player-action γ(a) =:
P
2Ma  and the anti-player-action γ(−a) =:
P
b6=a γ(b). Notice that, for each
player a, we clearly have γ = γ(a)+γ(−a). We can also introduce a sentence Playa, saying that \player
a is the one to play", and a sentence Pa, saying that \player a wins some payo":
Playa =: preγ(a) =
_
2M
pre
8This means the appearance of their own moves to themselves is correct. But note that this does not imply that they
know the concrete realization, or resolution, of their own actions in each context: the moves might be non-deterministic,
without the player being able to distinguish between its dierent simple resolutions; he only knows the type of his own
action.
9Example: the move \pick a card" (at random, from a pack, without looking at the cards in the pack) in a card-game.
Let’s assume that this move includes turning face up the card you have picked and looking at it. The simple actions
subsumed by this move are all the actions of type \pick card X", where X is any particular card (e.g. a Queen of Swords).
The player cannot choose any of these simple actions (he cannot choose a particular card of his liking), but only their
type (he can choose whether or not to perform the non-deterministic move of picking a card at random). This justies our
terminology: what we call \moves" in a game can only be such \types" of actions, which are suceptible to be \chosen" by
the agents. A player can indeed learn from his own such move (e.g. can learn there was a Queen of Swords in the pack),
but cannot learn from any of the deterministic simple actions subsumed by the move: he already knows that, if he’ll choose
a Queen of Swords, then there must have been such a queen in the pack; what he learns, in fact, is to distinguish which
of these simple-action-components of his move is actually realized.
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Pa =:
ma_
k=1
P ka :
(As a consequence, we have kPlayak = Playa and kPak = Pa.)
As announced, we list some conditions for games:
1. Playa \Playb = ; for a 6= b (\no two players can move in the same time")
2. s 2 Pka i sb  Pka (\every player knows every other player’s winning payo")
3. if s 2 Pka then s:  Pka, for every move  2M (\once you win, you win: game’s over for you")
4. s 2 Pa i s:γa = ; (\you win a payo i you cannot make a new move")
5. every  2 Ma has as precondition a sentence (equivalent to one) of the form 2a’, for some
sentence ’ (\a player knows when he can make a given move")
6. Pja  Pka for j  k (\if you win an amount bigger than k, then you win at least k")
Of course, in the formal semantics we will interpret the special atoms using the payo sets: kP ka k =: Pka.
It is easy to see that the conditions listed above in the denition of a game correspond to special modal
sentences in our language:
Proposition 5.1 A game satises any of the above six conditions i the corresponding condition in the
list below is valid (i.e. true in all epistemic states):
1’. Playa −! :Playb, for a 6= b
2’. P ka  ! 2bP ka
3’. P ka −! []P ka for every move a 2M
4’. Pa  ! :Playa
5’. pre  ! 2apre
6’. P ja −! P ka , for j  k.
One of the natural requirements which are usually imposed on game-trees for games with imperfect
information is that at states that are indistinguishable for player a, the sets of a’s available moves are
the same. One can easily see that this is a consequence of our conditions, more precisely of condition 5.
The requirement is usually stated in the S5 context of standard game theory, but in our more general
S4 context, we can dene \indistinguishability for player a" as \bisimilarity of appearances for player
a", by putting: s a t i sa  ta (where  is set-bisimilarity). Then we can prove that condition 5
implies that:
for every a-move  2Ma; if s a t and s 2 Play then t 2 Play:
Game-playing Situations. The set of all possible initial states of the game G is StartG = fs 2Mod :
s:γNG  Pg. Again, it is to see that this set is denable by the modal logic sentence
V
a2Ag[γ
N
G ](
W
k P
k
a ),
which says that after at most N moves one has to reach a terminal state. A game-playing situation is
a pair (G; s) of a game and an initial epistemic state s 2 StartG. It is clear that, given a game-playing
situation (G; s), we can use our product-update operation to compute the set (G; s)+ of all possible
\next" game-playing situations:
(G; s)+ =: f(G−1; s0) : s0 2 γG:sg
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where G−1 is the game that looks just like G, except that the upper bound for the number of rounds is
N − 1. Applying repeatedly this operation, we can dene the set (G; s)(n) of all possible n-step game-
playing situations by: (G; s)(0) =: (G; s) and (G; s)(n+1) =: ((G; s)(n))+. Finally, by applying this N
times, we can compute the set of all possible outcomes of the game G played on the initial state s:
O(G; s) =: (G; s)(N):
Strategies and Strategy Proles. The set of all partial (rule-based) strategies of player a (strategies
denoted by (a); 0(a); : : : ), is dened inductively by
(a); 0(a) ::=  (2Ma) j if 2a’ do (a) else 0(a)
So a-strategies are conditional actions, with conditions being given by knowledge tests for agent a
and actions being given by a’s possible moves10. This concept is formally dierent from the standard
semantic concept of strategy in game theory, but it’s related. In game theory, strategies are functions
from equivalence classes (modulo the indistiguishability relation !a, assumed to be S5) into possible
moves. Our denition refers to strategies as action-terms of a specic kind. We think our denition is
more natural in a rule-based approach to games. Clearly, one can recover the associate game-theoretic
strategy from these strategic terms: just take the interpretations (truth-sets) of the conditions (the
knowledge tests) in our conditional expressions for strategies; in the S5-case these will split up into !a-
equivalence classes (since the interpretation of a knowledge test for a is closed under!a-equivalence). So
we can just dene the strategy, by mapping an equivalence class into the move which occurs in our term-
strategy as being conditioned by a knowledge test which includes the given equivalence class. For nite
games, we can also go the other way around: we can recover one denition from the other (since nite
epistemic structures are characterizable up to bisimilarity in epistemic logic with common-knowledge
operators)
Total strategies are those strategies  which exhaust all the possibilities. Logically, they can be
characterized by the validity of the sentence pre(a)  ! Playa.
For a set A  Ag of players, an A-prole of strategies is an indexed tuple ~ = f(a)ga2Ag, s.t. each
(a) is a total strategy of player a. Then we write ~a =: (a). A full prole is an Ag-prole of strategies.
Given an A-prole and some player a 2 A, we can dene an Anfag-prole ~−a = fb : b 6= ag. Similarly
to the game-action and the player-action, for a given prole ~ = faga2A we can dene a prole-action
γ(~) =:
X
a2A
?(Playa)  a:
A prole-playing situation is a pair (~; s) of a full prole of strategies for some game G and an initial state
s 2 StartG. Similarly to the operations (G; s)+, (G; s)(n) and O(G; s) dened above for game-playing
situations, we can dene the following: the set (~; s)+ =: f(~; s0) : s0 2 γ(~)g of all the possible next
prole-playing situations; the set (~; s)(n) of all possible n-step prole-playing situations, set dened by
(~; s)0 =: (~; s) and (~; s)(n+1) =: ((~; s)(n))+; and nally the set of all possible outcomes of playing the
strategy prole ~ on the initial state s:
O(~; s) =: (~; s)(N)
where N is the length of the game.
Best possible answers and Nash equilibria in games with incomplete information
It is rather easy to write a dynamic logic formula (for instance, using our game-action and some similar
concept for strategy-actions) which captures the concept of a strategy prole being a Nash equilibrium in
games with perfect information. Moreover, one can do this while avoiding quantication over strategies.
10This is very close to the notion of knowledge-based protocols, introduced in [FHMV].
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(This is important: in general, their number is huge. In fact, remember that we chose to not even
introduce the semantical concept of a strategy, as it is usually done, so we cannot do this quantication:
we would have to quantify over all the innitely many equivalent action-expressions that describe the
same strategy.)
But it is harder to do it for games with imperfect information, as the ones we are dealing with here. In
fact, to do it, we have to restrict ourselves back to S5-games and states. So, for the rest of this section,
we restrict our states (and actions) to S5-states (and S5-actions) (i.e. states s such that s !a s) and
we postulate as an additional axiom the specic S5 axiom (2a’ !a ’). An S5 game-playing situation
is a pair (G; s) s.t. G has only S5-moves and the starting state s is S5. To any such S5 game situation
we can associate in the obvious way a game-tree in the traditional sense, of a game with incomplete
information.
Let us rst recall, using our notations, the denitions for best possible answer to a strategy prole",
\Nash equilibrium" and \subgame perfect equilibrium". (In the following, we are using the notation Oa
introduced above for the minimal payo of player a in the set of outcomes O.)
Denition Given a prole-playing situation (~; s) (for a game G), a’s strategy ~a is said to be a best
possible answer in the initial state s to the adversary ’s Ag nfag-prole of strategies ~−a i for any other
a-strategy 0a we have:
O(~; s)a  O(~−a; 0a; s)a:
The prole-playing situation (~; s) is a Nash equilibrium if for every agent a, ~a is a best possible answer
in s to ~−a. Finally, the strategy prole ~ is a subgame perfect equilibrium if (~; s) is a Nash equilibrium
for every playable state s.
By unfolding this denition and translating it into our language, we can immediately give a rst
logical translation of the notion of \best possible answer"; this translation will involve quantication
over strategies, so it will in fact be a schema, not a formula in our language: in the initial state s, ~a is
a best possible answer to ~−a i for every other a-strategy 0a and every 1  k  ma, we have that
[γ(~−a) + γ(0a)]
NP ka −! [γ(~)]NP ka :
But we can improve on this translation, by using the epistemic modalities in the S5-context, to
obtain an equivalent formula, in which we do not have to quantify over strategies. Indeed, let us put
γ(~; a) =:
P
2Ma(γ(~)−a+)
a. Then the promised equivalent for being the best answer is the following:^
1kma
(2a < γ(~; a) >)NP ka −! 2a < γ(~) >N P ka :
(where <  > is the dual of [] (i.e <  > ’ = :[]:’.)
In words, this says that a strategy ~a for player a is the best answer to a prole of adversary’s strategies
i: whenever there exists a strategy 0 s.t. that a knows that 0 will ensure some minimal payo then
he/she also knows that already the given strategy 0 will ensure at least the same payo. Unfolding this
even more, to get closer to the actual formula, we obtain that: whenever it exists some a-move s.t. a
knows that after using this move against the given prole of adversary’s strategies, there will still exist
some a-move s.t. a will know that after using against the same prole a will know etc... that after N
such moves he can get some minimal payo, then a can also be sure that the given strategy ~a will
ensure at least the same payo.
This is a way of using iterated knowledge to express properties of (knowledge-based)-strategies: the
quantier over a-strategies is replaced by N iterations of the box 2a. Now, by using this expression for
\being a best possible answer", we can get the desired modal expression for Nash equilibrium:
Proposition 5.2 In the game-tree with incomplete information associated to an S5 game-playing situ-
ation, a prole playing situation (~; s) is a Nash equilibrium i the following modal sentence is true at
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the initial state s: ^
a2Ag
ma^
k=1
(2a < γ(~; a) >)NP ka −! 2a < γ(~) >N P ka )
Similarly, a strategy prole ~ is a subgame perfect equilibrium i the above modal sentence is valid (i.e.
true at all playable states).
Remark that in this proposition, the epistemic operator 2a (to be read now as ’knowledge’, since it
is truthful: we are back in S5) plays an important role: we cannot drop it and talk simply in terms of
strategies and dynamic logic. There might indeed exist a way to play a’s moves in the game (i.e. γ(a))
s.t., when the others still play their equilibrium strategies, a could achieve a higher payo than playing
his equilibrium strategy. But this can only happen \by accident", as agent a cannot plan on it: there is
no way to systematically ensure this will happen, i.e. there is no way for a to know in advance that it
will happen.
The more interesting cases are of course the more non-classical, non-S5 ones. We are currently working
towards a more general approach of this kind to \games with hidden moves" (cheating, suspicion of
cheating), based on our logic of epistemic actions.
6. Comparison with Other Work
The origins of the subject are in Fagin et al [FHMV], where the authors analyze knowledge in distributed
systems, using a mixture of epistemic logic S5m and temporal logic. The fundamental issues, examples
and insights that gave rise to our logic come from the work in [FHMV]. But their approach is rather
dierent, being based mainly on temporal logic, instead of dynamic logic. Moreover, we think their
approach runs into several problems, which we were trying to avoid. First, the resulting logic is too
strong: in general, it is not decidable. 11 Secondly, from a dierent conceptual perspective, their logic
seems to be not expressive enough: there is no notion of updating knowledge (information); one cannot
talk about the change of information induced by specic actions, but only about what happens \next"
(or \always" or \sometimes" in the future), and this is only determined by the model. (In their setting,
the semantics is given by \runs", i.e. temporal sequences inside a huge Kripke structure, describing all
possible evolutions of the system.) When they actually analyze concrete examples (e.g. The Muddy
Children Puzzle), they do not use their formal logic only, but also \external" (semantic) reasoning about
models; in eect, they simply \update" their structures from the outside (in the meta-language) according
to informal intuitions, but without any attempt to give a systematic treatment of this operation. Both
technically and philosophically, our approach is essentially dierent: our models are simpler and easier
to handle, as we are trying, not just to keep them nite, but to keep them as small as possible. In
eect, we do not incorporate all the possible runs into the system as they do (as well as the game-
theoreticians). Instead, our epistemic state models contain only information about the present moment
(and the agent’s uncertainties about it). The rest of the information is stored somewhere else: part of
it, in the action-models, which describe only the properties of actions and the uncertainties concerning
them. Other pieces of information (e.g. about the available actions, or \moves", the rules of the game,
constraints about the future etc) are contained in our concept of a rule-based game. Strategies, strategy
proles, beliefs about strategies etc are separate actions; in on-going work we are trying to formalize
what is called in game theory the \epistemic type" of a player.
One of the seminal ideas of our work comes from a paper of Gerbrandy and Groeneveld [GG]. The
idea was to combine Fagin-style epistemic logic with the work of Veltman [V] on update semantics. The
authors introduce special kinds of epistemic actions, namely public announcements (\group updates").
Their logic is strong enough to capture all the reasoning involved in The Muddy Children Puzzle. In his
Ph.D. dissertation [G], Gerbrandy improves and extends these ideas with a \program-update" logic.
11Only thirty-two of the ninety-six logics of knowledge and time analyzed by Halpern and Vardi [HV] contain common-
knowledge operators; out of these, all but twelve are undecidable.
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Our own work started from observing some odd (or at least not always desirable) features of Ger-
brandy’s and Groeneveld’s public announcements. Namely, they have \group-learning" actions of the
form LA’, with the intended meaning \the agents in the group A learn in common that ’ is true". The
problem is that, with their denition, agents that are outside the group A (the \outsiders") do not in any
way suspect that the group-announcement is happening. Of course, they wouldn’t know it is happening
(since they are not part of the \inside" group), but (by the denition in [GG]) these outsiders are not
even allowed to consider the possibility that such an announcement might be happening. As a result,
they are totally \mislead": after this action, in the resulting Kripke structure, the outsiders \live in an
ideal world" (i.e. they do not \access" the actual world anymore). To put it dierently, even if the initial
model was a \knowledge structure" (i.e. S5m-model), updating it with any announcement with at least
two insiders and one outsider will result in a non-knowledge (non-S5m, more specically non-reflexive)
structure: the outsider acquires false beliefs about the world. Such an interesting \deceiving" situation
is indeed possible in real life and we would like to still have such an action in our logic; but we wouldn’t
want to impose that every group-announcement-with-outsiders be necessarily deceiving! Moreover, we
would like to give the outsiders a better chance: not only that they could suspect something is going on,
but on the basis of this suspicion they might act, attempting to conrm their suspicions. They could,
for instance, wiretap or intercept the communications of the \insiders".
The work of H. P. van Ditmarsch, although related in content, did not influence much our own work, as
we have discovered it later, and enjoyed some comments and communications with him on these issues.
From our perspective, we can just point out that all the actions (for the game of Cluedo) introduced
in his Ph. D. dissertation are very special cases of our actions. Although he did not study the meta-
theoretical properties of his logic, we think that completeness and decidability of his logic follows trivially
as a particular case of our work.
7. Conclusions and Future Projects
In our work, developed in [BMS], [BMS2], [B], the present paper and our on-going work in [B2], we
further generalized in several directions the ideas arising from [GG]. The main conceptual and technical
novelty consisted in our product-semantics for update, in which we have endowed actions with their own,
internal epistemic structure. In addition to its philosophical importance, this idea has clear technical
advantages: if oers a simple, compact way to represent epistemic changes and to compute their eect; it
has greatly simplied our prior work on completeness and decidability for various logics, some proposed
by J. Gerbrandy and H. van Ditmarsch, some arising from our own work; in its \syntactical" version,
the idea of endowing actions with an epistemic \appearance" was useful in formulating simple, intuitive
axioms to describe the interplay between knowledge (belief) and change. The space does not permit us
here to go into a discussion of the axioms, but we would like to stress the importance we attribute to our
Action-Knowledge Axiom. We think it captures a new, important insight about the relation between
prior knowledge (or belief), posterior knowledge and knowledge (or belief) of the action itself. The
Action-Common-Knowledge Rule is an \iterated" version of the above-mentioned axiom, a rule with a
certain inductive (or rather co-inductive) nature; it ensures a way for checking, before some action is
taken, what are the conditions in which this action might lead to new facts becoming common knowledge.
In this paper and the related on-going paper [B2] (to which I have relegated the proofs and the
technical details), I am generalizing further the approach developed in our previous work, by adding
non-determinism and change of facts, by extending our previous proofs of completeness to the present
setting; and I apply it to sketch the beginning of an analysis of information-flow in games, analysis
based on a formalization of rule-based games in terms of epistemic actions.
Finally, I would like to mention my related on-going work: rst of all, in both [B] and [B2], the approach
is slightly dierent (and more general in my unpublished [B2] than here): I am using there variables for
actions, which allows me to introduce a xed-point operator to describe actions that involve epistemic
circularity and self-reference. In that more general context, the mutual-learning-operator (originating in
some form from Gerbrandy) can simply be dened, via a xed point expression. I have chosen to keep
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it simpler here, for reasons of readability. Secondly, as mentioned above, I am working on enriching the
present approach in order to deal with softer game-theoretic issues. In particular, I am looking at the
logic obtained by adding Kleene star (iteration) on top of ours: this would indeed be very useful in a
game theoretic context, but the problems of completeness and decidability for this logic are open. More
generally, at present I have an extension of the epistemic action logic into an \epistemic process algebra"
and a modal logic going with it: it is obtained by adding a parallel composition and a (process-algebra-
style) communication operator between actions. In fact, this development is even more interesting from a
game-theoretic perspective: not only we are able to capture in simple, concise formulas the outcome of a
game, the projected outcome, counter-factual reasoning, equilibria concepts, rationalizability, epistemic
types of players, belief-revision in games, but the setting seems to open up new possibilities, new \kinds"
of games, in which the strategies, the mutual beliefs, the rules of the game, the winning conventions, the
number and identity of players etc, are all revisable in the midst of playing the game.
In other on-going work, I propose a generalization of epistemic actions to capture probabilistic epistemic
actions (in which the epistemic arrows are replaced by probability distributions, and in which our update
operation is combined with Bayesian belief-revision). The most promising approach (but potentially very
hard) involves combining the probabilistic belief-update with the process-algebra approach and trying to
use some of the recent work on process algebras for continuous probabilistic systems, for getting logics
that are closer to the hard-core classical game theory.
As a last remark, I would like to express my pious hope that this paper could be the beginning of a
more general study of the \logic of cheating at games" : a logic for the suspicious player.
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